Optimisation of strategy placements for public good in complex networks

Abstract

Game theory has long been used to model cognitive decision making in societies. While traditional game theoretic modelling has focussed on well-mixed populations, recent research has suggested that the topological structure of social networks play an important part in the dynamic behaviour of social systems. Any agent or person playing a game employs a strategy (pure or mixed) to optimise pay-off. Previous studies have analysed how selfish agents can optimise their payoffs by choosing particular strategies within a social network model. In this paper we ask the question that, if agents were to work towards the common goal of increasing the public good (that is, the total network utility), what strategies they should adapt within the context of a heterogeneous network. We consider a number of classical and recently demonstrated game theoretic strategies, including cooperation, defection, general cooperation, Pavlov, and zero-determinant strategies, and compare them pairwise. We use the Iterative Prisoners Dilemma game simulated on scale-free networks, and use a genetic-algorithmic approach to investigate what optimal placement patterns evolve in terms of strategy. In particular, we ask the question that, given a pair of strategies are present in a network, which strategy should be adopted by the hubs (highly connected people), for the overall betterment of society (high network utility). We find that cooperation as opposed to defection, Pavlov as opposed to general cooperator, general cooperator as opposed to zero-determinant, and pavlov as opposed to zero-determinant, strategies will be adopted by the hubs, for the overall increased utility of the network. The results are interesting, since given a scenario where certain individuals are only capable of implementing certain strategies, the results give a blueprint on where they should be placed in a complex network for the overall benefit of the society.