Abstract

This paper analyses implementation policies of environmental quota trade, with the Flemish nutrient production rights as an example. Implementation policies concern the transaction quantity, quota reduction and prevention of speculation. They are analysed with a static and a dynamic multi-agent quota trade model. The static model with discrete non-auctioned quota trade shows that the obligation for quota sellers to entirely stop their production stimulates structural change. The dynamic model version indicates that a flat rate reduction on traded quota and measures taken to prevent speculation combined with too low penalties for overuse stimulate the total production.

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