Abstract
This study proposes an emission-intensity-based emission tax as a policy solution for negative environmental externality in oligopoly markets. Emissions are taxed when firms' emission intensities exceed their target level. We show that even under imperfect competition, this emission pricing policy leads to the first-best outcome. The optimal tax rate is equal to the Pigovian tax. This principle can also apply to tradable emission permits traded based on emission intensity targets.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
