Optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration under carbon neutrality: a game-theoretic perspective

Abstract

This paper studies the optimal vehicle fleet planning and collaboration problem for a fuel vehicle (FV) transport service provider, a commercial electric vehicle (CEV) transport service provider, and a carbon emission treatment agency under carbon neutrality. The FV transport service provider pays a fixed fee or a portion of its sales revenue to a carbon emission treatment agency in exchange for technology to reduce its carbon emissions, and it can adopt three strategies (i.e., no emission reduction, purchasing technology for emission reduction, and entrusting a carbon emission treatment agency). We derive each party’s optimal fleet size, price, and profit in the three scenarios. Our results suggest that carbon emission reduction strategies may improve the market performance of the FV transport service provider. Then, we find no certain strategy is always preferable to another: the optimal cooperation strategy between the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency depends on the fixed technology fee, ratio of revenue sharing, government penalty, the transport service market potential, and consumer green preference, as well as the cost per CEV. This paper gives the transport service provider and carbon emission treatment agency a full picture of whether, when, and how to collaborate in green commerce.