Abstract
In this paper we study the optimal policy in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital when agents value both consumption and leisure. We find that the government pursuing the first best can achieve its goal by a subsidy which depends on foregone earnings while studying and which is financed through a lump sum tax. Anyway, the optimal policy, that should be designed to provide incentives for agents to devote more time to schooling and cut both on leisure and working, is not unique. There exists an infinite number of combinations of consumption, capital income, labor income and lump sum taxes that can decentralize the first best.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
