Optimal strategies of a dual-channel green supply chain with recycling under retailer promotional effort

Abstract

Due to the hugely populated world, recycling of the used products has become the most significant perspective in e-commerce. The scientists have been exploring how increases the degree of recyclability and the green innovation level. This paper considers a supply chain with a manufacturer, a retailer, a supplier, and a collector. The manufacturer can increase or decrease the level of green innovation by changing the quality of raw materials. He sells them through his direct channel as well as the retailer’s traditional channel. The retailer enforces the strategy promotional effort for enlarging his market demand. After formulating the problem, the strategies in collector-led, supplier-led, collector–supplier Nash, and collector–supplier–retailer Nash game are studied under manufacturer Stackelberg games along with the centralized policy. The parameters’ sensitivity has been analyzed to the profits and decision variables and then draw significant managerial insights. The model declares the optimal strategies for each player as well as the chain. It is achieved that the higher level of green innovation and promotional effort always increases all the profit. The optimal pricing decisions be lowest under the Collector–Supplier Nash game.