Abstract
This article characterizes optimal social security in economies with agents who exhibit loss aversion. Two forms of loss aversion are explored. In the first, workers have a fixed retirement age and are loss averse over private savings. This motivates a more generous social security program. In the second, workers do no private savings but can choose their retirement age, exhibiting loss aversion over the foregone leisure time from delayed retirement. Social security benefits consequently rise steeper with retirement age and an earlier normal retirement age is optimal. In both cases, optimal policy is highly sensitive to the introduction of loss averse preferences.
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