Abstract
Abstract We analytically characterize the effects of ownership and competition in the healthcare industry on quality provision, market coverage and optimal reimbursement policy. A for-profit monopoly selects a lower quality than a nonprofit supplier, and the socially optimal reimbursement rate with a nonprofit monopoly exceeds that with a for-profit monopoly. We establish that the optimal repayment policy is invariant to the introduction of competition by a for-profit high-quality supplier. Thus, market coverage is invariant to the introduction of competition, whereas consumers with a higher willingness to pay for quality are better off with competition.
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