Abstract

For the single-consumer Ramsey tax model, the use of distortionary taxation to finance public good provision is shown to lower the optimal level of public good provision below its optimal value ina first-best economy, where lump sum taxation is available. The assumptions used in the proof include a previous Cobb-Douglas example as a special case.

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