Abstract

In an Islamic financial system, interest is replaced by a profit-sharing system in which risks are shared between lenders and borrowers. Concerns have been expressed that in such a system investment will decline. This paper formulates investment behavior in a profit-sharing system as a principal-agent problem and investigates the relevant issues under conditions of uncertainty and moral hazard. A major conclusion of the paper is that the assertion of investment decline cannot be justified and that, under certain conditions, a profit-sharing system may lead to an increase in investment.

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