Optimal pricing and complex analysis for low-carbon apparel supply chains

Abstract

Motivated by the low-carbon economic development, we study the competition issues in apparel supply chains considering consumers’ low-carbon preferences. In this paper, we construct static and dynamic decision-making models under different game scenarios based on the centralized and decentralized frameworks. Firstly, we explore the critical conversion conditions between the centralized and decentralized frameworks with the static game models. The centralized model benefits the whole supply chain when the low-carbon investment coefficient is moderate. On the contrary, the decentralized model benefits the supply chain when the low-carbon investment coefficient is smaller or larger. Secondly, combined with the local and global bifurcation theory, we examine the complex effect of adjustment parameters on the dynamic system. The dynamic game systems show bifurcation, chaos, and multi-stability as the adjustment parameters change continuously. Therefore, we apply a hybrid chaos control method to stabilize the dynamic system. Thirdly, we compare the average profits in the dynamic game scenarios and show the complex relationships with the varying parameters. Finally, some management insights and suggestions are presented based on our findings.