Optimal prediction of decisions and model selection in social dilemmas using block models

Marta Sales-Pardo,Antonia Godoy-Lorite,Jordi Duch,Sergio Cobo-López,Roger Guimerà

doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-018-0175-3

Abstract

Advancing our understanding of human behavior hinges on the ability of theories to unveil the mechanisms underlying such behaviors. Measuring the ability of theories and models to predict unobserved behaviors provides a principled method to evaluate their merit and, thus, to help establish which mechanisms are most plausible. Here, we propose models and develop rigorous inference approaches to predict strategic decisions in dyadic social dilemmas. In particular, we use bipartite stochastic block models that incorporate information about the dilemmas faced by individuals. We show, combining these models with empirical data on strategic decisions in dyadic social dilemmas, that individual strategic decisions are to a large extent predictable, despite not being “rational.” The analysis of these models also allows us to conclude that: (i) individuals do not perceive games according their game-theoretical structure; (ii) individuals make decisions using combinations of multiple simple strategies, which our approach reveals naturally.

Highlights

Many human activities have strong recurrent patterns that make them easy to predict [1, 2]
8 Discussion and conclusions We have explored the power of group-based models to predict decisions made by individuals in simple classes of dyadic games that involve strategic thinking
Proposing interpretable models of human behavior and comparing them in terms of their predictive accuracy sets the bases for advancing the social sciences on solid grounds [11]

Summary

Introduction

Many human activities have strong recurrent patterns that make them easy to predict [1, 2]. Other activities involve active decision making and are, not so obviously predictable These include relatively simple decisions about, for example, which movie to watch or which book to purchase [3, 4], as well as complex strategic decisions in which individuals need to anticipate and take into consideration the decisions of others. Experimental approaches, in which individuals play simplified games that pose specific social dilemmas, have been insightful and have demonstrated that individuals often do not act “rationally” to maximize their profits [7,8,9] This makes their behaviors more unpredictable than one may have anticipated. They have not assessed quantitatively the power of existing theories to predict accurately the actions of each individual

Objectives

Findings

Conclusion