Abstract
The optimal pollution tax becomes complicated when allowance is made for endogenous innovation, under a patent system. However, if anything, it is below marginal environmental damages, to counteract monopoly pricing by the patent holder, the common pool effect associated with research and a possible excess of patent holder revenue over the social benefits from innovation when environmental damages are convex. In cases where patents are weak at securing appropriability, for example when rivals can easily imitate around patented technologies, awarding research prizes or contracts is probably more efficient than raising the pollution tax.
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