Abstract
In two-person zero-sum games with perfect recall, one can easily describe minimax strategies in the form of behavioral strategies at least when the number of possible information sets is not too large. The actual calculation of optimal behavioral strategies was always carried via the detour of mixed strategies. The cost in computation and storage was bounded in that the normal form and minimax strategies were calculated on the basis of a manageable selection of pure strategies. The principal component of the criterion just sketched is the calculation of optimal counterstrategies. One should keep in mind that behavioral strategies do much more than simplify the description of minimax strategies. Minimax behavioral strategies can also be determined directly from the solution of a linear optimization problem for a two-person zero-sum game with perfect recall. Both the number of variables and the number of inequalities can be bounded by the number of parameters that are necessary for characterizing a pair of behavioral strategies.
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