Abstract
Patent breadth and length have been discussed extensively in innovation literature. In this article, I analyze the optimal degree of novelty of patent protection and its tradeoff with patent length. In the context of subsequent innovations each innovation builds on the previous one. The degree of novelty necessary for a non-infringing patent is crucial for the firms’ incentive to innovate. One of the findings is that a monopolist’s optimal degree of novelty is lesser than would be socially desirable. Furthermore, there exists a finite optimal patent length. Competitors introducing an improved technology cause uncertainty which may be compensated by extending patent length.
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