Optimal model of power bidding in deregulation for off peak & peak demand situations

Abstract

In deregulated electricity market a number of Generating companies (Genco.) are competing among themselves for maximizing their own profit. They are offering different bidding prices at different demand situations. There may be different category of bidding situations. In off peak demand situation they are offering bids at low price as low risk bidding. Similarly in peak demand condition they are claiming more prices getting more profit from consumers those who are compelled to pay more. In these case studies, this off peak demand situation, generating companies bidding is categorized as “near marginal” bidding & peak demand situation bidding is considered as “super marginal” bidding. The bidding is interconnected with generation scheduling with consideration of power balance constraint, power generation limit & fuel cost constraints etc. for thermal generating units. Economic power scheduling of generating companies at above mentioned bidding situations have been searched from the solutions using Newton-Raphson method for standard IEEE 9 bus test system. Bidder's profits, market price, transmission loss have been calculated f o r each case. For optimization of the power bidding problem, theory of dominance of Game Theory has been applied & justified for searching the Nash equilibrium.