Abstract
We adopt contract theory to design a mechanism for interaction between the content provider (CP) and mobile users (MUs) with asymmetric information. To incentivize MUs to consume more content, a content scheme is proposed in which the CP provides some financial assistance to MUs. This scheme yields both the MUs and CP benefit due to gained utility and advertisement revenue in response to high data usage, respectively. We prove that a unique functional strategy exists to allocate the content demand and financial assistance based on MUs' types. This strategy satisfies the incentive compatibility, individual rationality and maximizes the CP's profit.
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