Abstract
We determine optimal market access pricing for an exchange or Social Planner. Exchanges optimally use rebate-based pricing (vs. strictly positive fees) when ex ante gains-from-trade and trading activity are low (high). Exchange rebate-based pricing increases (decreases) welfare when investor valuation dispersion and trading activity are low (high). A Social Planner increases welfare using rebate-based pricing. High-frequency traders strengthen exchange incentives for rebate-based pricing; a new explanation for widespread Maker-Taker and Taker-Maker pricing. With HFTs, rebate-based pricing improves total welfare, but Pareto transfers are needed to improve investor welfare. Sequential bargaining games between competing exchanges setting fees have pure-strategy equilibria.
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