Abstract
AbstractPerformance-based road maintenance contracts (PBRMCs) are an effective mechanism to transfer risk and responsibility of road maintenance activities to the private sector. Proper structuring of performance indicators and the extent of penalties and incentives in the contract has a significant effect on the overall cost and level of service (LOS) provided to the public. This research develops a series of mathematical optimization models and a computational tool that allows road agencies and contractors to better structure the following contractual conditions in a performance-based contract (PBC) for road maintenance: (1) types of performance indicators to be considered; (2) their threshold levels; and (3) the appropriate levels of penalties and incentives. The availability of such models and tools will allow road agencies and contractors that are unfamiliar with PBRMCs to make informed decisions on their approach to contractual risk allocation. A case study of a major highway in Egypt is presented t...
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
