Optimal Inter-Basin Water Allocation Using Crisp and Fuzzy Shapley Games

Abstract

In recent years, uneven distribution of available water resources as well as increasing water demands and overexploiting the water resources have brought severe need for transferring water from basins having sufficient water to basins facing water shortages. Therefore, optimal allocation of shared water resources in water transfer projects, considering the utilities of different stakeholders, physical limitations of the system and socioeconomic criteria is an important task. In this paper, a new methodology based on crisp and fuzzy Shapley games is developed for optimal allocation of inter-basin water resources. In the proposed methodology, initial water allocations are obtained using an optimization model considering an equity criterion. In the second step, the stakeholders form crisp coalitions to increase the total net benefit of the system as well as their own benefits and a crisp Shapley Value game is used to reallocate the benefits produced in the crisp coalitions. Lastly, to provide maximum total net benefit, fuzzy coalitions are constituted and the participation rates of water users to fuzzy coalitions are optimized. Then, the total net benefit is reallocated to water users in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Shapley Value game. The effectiveness of this method is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in southern Iran to the Rafsanjan plain in central Iran.