Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia

Abstract

The observation that only one out of 14 tons of sulphur compounds immissions in Austria originates from Austrian sources highlights the contribution of transboundary pollution (predominantly from Eastern Europe). Therefore, further abatement in Austria has only a marginal impact but is very costly given the already high Austrian abatement standards. Thus, scientists and politicians conclude that it is in the rich countries' (e.g., Austria, Germany and the Scandinavian countries) own interest to support environmental protection in the former centrally planned economies that are apparently less concerned about environmental harms and risks. However, the proposed policies lead to a crowding out of the recipient country's own abatement investments. In order to mitigate such strategic behaviour, which is possible due to asymmetric information, we apply the principal-agent theory to derive optimal incentives. These incentives are in stark contrast to actual policy proposals, in particular, no subsidy should be paid if the neighbouring and polluting country does not care sufficiently about environment. Indeed, the empirical application shows that only sufficient environmental concern in Czechoslovakia warrants subsidies from Austria.