Abstract
We consider mechanisms in two-level active systems, where additional conditions of incentive compatibility are imposed on planning procedures and incentive schemes to coordinate preferences of agents and a principal. These conditions ensure plan fulfillment and truth-telling (strategy-proofness). Finally, sufficient conditions of optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms are established.
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