Optimal export taxes in a multicountry framework

Abstract

This paper extends the optimum export tax analysis to multicountry partial (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) frameworks, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global cocoa market. Analyzing myopic optimum, Nash optimum and Nash revenue maximizing taxes, we show that optimum and revenue maximizing taxes obtained in the GE framework differ from their PE counterparts, as they are determined not only by the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing the country, but by domestic supply conditions as well. Second, not only are Nash revenue maximizing taxes higher than Nash optimum taxes in the GE, but, paradoxically, the society attains a higher level of welfare under Nash revenue maximizing taxes than under Nash optimum taxes. Finally, we show that the frequent use of Lerner symmetry [Lerner, A.P., 1936. The symmetry between import and export taxes. Economica 11, 306–313.] in the policy-oriented analysis of optimum export taxes is not warranted.