Optimal Electricity Allocation Model Under China's Planning-Market Double-Track Mechanism Considering Bidding Game of Generation Companies

Abstract

In China, under the planning-market double-track mechanism implemented on the generation side of electricity, unreasonable market-oriented power generation proportion may lead to unnecessary vicious competition and market price changes, and it is against the will of power exchange (PX). Given this background, in this study, a bi-level model for planning-market electricity allocation that considers the bidding game of generation companies is proposed for a smooth transition of power system reform. In the upper level of the model, the proportion of planned electricity is optimized by PX to minimize the average social electricity purchase price. In the lower level of the model, considering the impact of market power on the bidding strategy of generation companies, the bidding strategy of generation companies set as price makers is proposed using the residual demand curve analysis method, while the price takers adopt the lowest bidding strategy. Simulations based on data from a provincial electricity market in China illustrate that the proposed model can effectively reflect the impact of market-oriented electricity proportion on market power and market-clearing price, thus providing a quantitative basis for PX to determine the proportion of market-oriented electricity in total electricity consumption.