Optimal DoS attack strategy for cyber-physical systems: A Stackelberg game-theoretical approach

Abstract

In this paper, the optimal DoS attack on cyber-physical systems is studied in Stackelberg game framework, which is manifested by energy allocation on communication channels. To give a realistic picture of DoS attack on a normal user launched by several hackers, a Stackelberg game between one defender and multiple attackers is considered. Compared with the existing literature, which mainly focus on equilibrium in static games, the dynamic process of the Stackelberg game is also reflected in this paper, which demonstrates the intelligence of attackers switching channels to allocate aggressive energy. In the solution of Stackelberg equilibrium, self-adaptive Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm is utilized to cope with the nonlinearity of the reward function. Besides, for the purpose of better performance of both sides in choosing channels to allocate energy, an online computation algorithm is proposed. Finally, numerical examples are equipped to illustrate the theoretical results proved in this work.