Abstract
This paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms in a framework with a twodimensional policy space and no monetary transfers. Contrary to the one-dimensional setting, if the conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension, the optimal mechanism never exhibits any pooling and the agent’s ideal policies are never chosen. Simple delegation sets that trade off inflexible rules and full discretion are no longer optimal but take more complex shapes.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
