Abstract
In a typical DDoS attack and defense scenario, both the attacker and the defender will take actions to maximize their utilities. However, each player does not know his opponent’s investment and cannot adopt the optimal strategies. We formalize a Bayesian game model to handle these uncertainties and specify two problems usually faced by the defender when choosing defense measures. A nonlinear programming method is proposed to handle policies’ permutation in order to maximize the defender’s utility. Followed the Nash equilibrium, security administrators can take optimal strategies. Finally, the practicality and effectiveness of the model and method are illustrated by an example.
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