Abstract
This article analyzes optimal taxation and debt policies in a model of overlapping generations of finite-lived agents. Taxes are levied proportionately on capital and labor incomes. Tax rates are uniform across all agents. When the social and private discount rates coincide, the optimal steady-state tax rate on capital income is zero. Alternatively, the optimal steady-state tax rate on capital income is positive (or negative), and the optimal steady-state level of government debt is larger (or smaller) whenever the social discount rate is greater (or less) than the private discount rate.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
