Optimal Board Monitoring in Family-Owned Companies: Evidence from Asia

Abstract

We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. The results confirm that more monitoring is not always associated with better performance. However, the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels.