Optimal balking strategies and pricing for the single server Markovian queue with compartmented waiting space

Abstract

We consider the single server Markovian queue and we assume that arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait. We suppose that the waiting space of the system is partitioned in compartments of fixed capacity for a customers. Before making his decision, a customer may or may not know the compartment in which he will enter and/or the position within the compartment in which he will enter. Thus, denoting by n the number of customers found by an arriving customer, he may or may not know ? n/a ?+1 and/or (n mod a)+1. We examine customers' behavior under the various levels of information regarding the system state and we identify equilibrium threshold strategies. We also study the corresponding social and profit maximization problems.