Abstract
This paper studies the investor's investment decision in a standard financial contracting model. The investor chooses between entrepreneurs with heterogeneous production technologies who generate different probability distributions of cash flow under effort. I provide a complete characterization of optimal contracts, agency rents, and the investor's investment decision. Differences in entrepreneurs' production technologies imply differences in optimal contracts and agency rents across equally productive entrepreneurs, which biases and potentially distorts the investor's investment decision. The results provide a complete characterization of entrepreneurs' financial constraints in the presence of heterogeneous production technologies and uncover a fundamental link between production technologies, financial contracts, and financial constraints.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
