Abstract

Modern vehicles are configured to exchange warning messages through IEEE 1609 Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) over IEEE 802.11p Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE). Essentially, these warning messages must associate an authentication factor such that the verifier authenticates the message origin via visual binding. Interestingly, the existing vehicle communication incorporates the message forward-ability as a requested feature for numerous applications. On the contrary, the vehicle security infrastructure is vulnerable to message forwarding i.e., Messages seem to originate from a malicious vehicle (due to non-detectable message relaying) instead of the actual message sender. We introduce the non forward-able authentication to avoid an adversary coalition attack scenario. These messages should be identifiable with respect to the immediate sender at every hop. We propose to utilize immediate optical response verification in association with the authenticated key exchange over radio channel. These optical responses are generated through hardware means, i.e., A certified Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) device embedded on the front and rear of the vehicle.

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