Opportunistic Behavior in Renegotiations Between Public-Private Partnerships and Government Institutions: Data on Public-Private Partnerships of the German Armed Forces

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study analyzes survey data on public-private partnerships (PPPs) of the German Armed Forces. The analyzed PPPs are unique in that the German Federal Ministry of Defence, a government institution, has a dual role as a main shareholder and a major customer. Drawing on these data, the present article analyzes how a government institution influences a PPP's set of objectives and shows that the conflict of interest with respect to monetary objectives between the government institution and the PPP as a whole is low in such partnerships. Furthermore, the article examines the opportunistic behavior of PPPs in contractual renegotiations where the government institution acts as a customer. The results show that, although such behavior indeed occurs, it does not concern monetary issues, since the government institution can control the monetary objectives of PPPs in which it is a main shareholder. Third, this study also analyzes and identifies certain exogenous factors that may influence the level of opportunistic behavior exhibited by the examined PPPs, providing evidence on the causes and effects of such behavior and indicating how it can be limited by the government institution.