Abstract
Carbon emission reduction has become a common hot topic around the world. Although the previous literature has proven that the asymmetric information and fairness concerns would influence the operational strategy for low-carbon supply chain, it hardly touched the asymmetric information of fairness concerns, which contradicted practical observations and experimental evidence. Incorporating the asymmetric information of fairness concerns, this paper investigates a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with discrete types including selfish S-type and fairness-concerned F-type. The manufacturer can observe and thereby know the behavioral type of the retailer in the scenario of symmetric information, while it cannot in the scenario of asymmetric information. In the approach of game theory, the optimal carbon emission reducing strategy and pricing strategy in the symmetric scenario and asymmetric scenario are achieved successively. By comparing the above two scenarios, the impacts stemming from the asymmetric information of fairness concerns at the individual level and systematic level are analyzed, respectively. A case study is offered before concluding some implications for the supply chain management. The findings include the following: Firstly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns enhances the carbon emission reduction significantly. Although the fairness concerns alone decrease the carbon emission reduction, the asymmetric information increases with the dominating power. Secondly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns raises the wholesale price and retail price dramatically. Although the impact of either fairness concerns or asymmetric information randomly changes with the behavioral type and information structure, their interactive impacts are stable and change smoothly. Thirdly, the asymmetric information of fairness concerns promotes a fairer profit distribution, while either fairness concerns or asymmetric information alone hardly changes the overall profit of the low-carbon supply chain.
Highlights
Reducing carbon emissions, as one of the core goals set in United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, is important for the whole world to realize global sustainable development. e high-level thematic debate of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly October 2021 is about delivering climate action
Comparing the above scenarios of symmetric and asymmetric information, explore the impacts stemming from the asymmetric information of fairness concerns on the pricing strategy, emission-reducing strategy, and profitability at two different levels. e individual level treats each member in the low-carbon supply chain independently and explores how the asymmetric information influences the individual decision and profit of each member. e systematic level treats the low-carbon supply chain as an entire system and investigates how the asymmetric information changes the operational performance of the supply chain
Concluding Results. is paper achieves the optimal operational strategy of the low-carbon supply chain under asymmetric information of fairness concerns and analyzes the impacts stemming from the asymmetric information of fairness concerns at the individual and systematic levels, respectively. e main findings include the following
Summary
As one of the core goals set in United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, is important for the whole world to realize global sustainable development. e high-level thematic debate of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly October 2021 is about delivering climate action. E largest developing country, China, plans to achieve the carbon peak by 2030 and carbon neutralization by 2060, President Xi Jinping promised at the general debate of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly September 2020 In both the industrial and academical views, reducing carbon emission and operational strategy of low-carbon supply chain have become a common hot topic around the world. By exploring the optimal operational strategy of the lowcarbon supply chain under asymmetric information of fairness concerns and analyzing the related impacts stemming from the asymmetric information of fairness concerns at the individual level of independent decision and systematic level of entire performance respectively, this paper acquires the following original contributions. Previous literature only examined the symmetric scenario but hardly touched how the fairness concerns influence the operational strategy in the scenario of asymmetric information.
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