Abstract

Safety instrumented systems are frequently deployed to reduce the risk associated with industrial activities, such as those in the oil and gas industry. A key requirement for safety-instrumented systems in standards like IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, is that the safety functions and their equipment must fulfill the requirements of a given safety integrity level. A safety integrity level formulates a maximum tolerated probability of failure on demand, which must be confirmed in design as well as follow-up phases. The equipment's failure rates are important inputs to this analysis, and these figures assumed from design must be re-estimated and verified based on the operational experiences with the equipment at the specific facility. A thorough review of reported failures from six Norwegian onshore and offshore oil and gas facilities indicates that equipment of similar type experience different failure rates and different distribution of the occurrence of failure modes. Some attempts have been made to identify the underlying influencing factors that can explain the differences, however, so far the utilization of data-driven methods have not been fully explored. The purpose of this paper is two-fold:1) demonstrate how data-driven methods, i.e. principal component analysis and partial least squares regression, can be used to identify important influencing factors, and 2) propose a framework for predicting the failure rates based on the reported failures. The framework is illustrated with a case study based on the data collected from the six facilities.

Highlights

  • Safety instrumented systems (SISs) are frequently used to reduce the risks associated with industrial activities in many industries, e.g. at process and nuclear power plants, and at oil and gas facilities (Rausand, 2014)

  • An industrial facility usually is equipped with several SISs, such as process shutdown (PSD) system to stop production in case of process upsets, and emergency shutdown (ESD) system to reduce the escalation of uncontrolled events like leakages by depressurizing and removing electrical ignition sources

  • In terms of their safety functions, shutdown valves can close and isolate related segments on demands, PSVs can be open on a predefined setpoint to relief pressure, level transmitters (LTs) measure the level in a vessel or tank, and gas detectors discover the presence of gas and initiate an alarm at specified concentrations

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Summary

Introduction

Safety instrumented systems (SISs) are frequently used to reduce the risks associated with industrial activities in many industries, e.g. at process and nuclear power plants, and at oil and gas facilities (Rausand, 2014). The PFD of a SIF must be estimated in design, using generic (often field-based) failure rates or those provided by manufacturers, and re-estimated in operation using reported failures from the facilities where the SIF is installed (Rausand, 2014). User-provided failure rates are based on aggregated time in service and the number of reported failures at one or more specific facilities owned by the same operating company. When the upper 95% percentile is approximately three times the mean value or lower, we may use the estimated failure rates based on operational experience (Hauge and Lundteigen, 2008) In this context, many oil and gas facilities invest time and resources to record failures to obtain estimated failure rates.

SINTEF
Definitions of the failures
Influencing factors
Data-driven models for identifying significant influencing factors
Framework of failure rate prediction
Step 1: data-collection
Step 2: identification of significant influencing factors
Step 3: failure rates prediction
Case study
Findings
Full Text
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