Opening Pandora’s box: the refusal of a president to sign a bill from parliament

Abstract

The Icelandic constitution prescribes, similar to constitutions of numerous European states, that a bill which is passed by the parliament, Althingi, shall be submitted to the president of the republic for confirmation. On January 5th 2010 the president of Iceland refused to sign a bill which provided for a state guarantee for the Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund, a fund established with the purpose of compensating depositors if they are unable to withdraw funds from their commercial bank. The president’s refusal, which is only the second refusal by a president since the founding of the republic, lead to considerable political uncertainty which only become somewhat clearer after a referendum was held on March 6th 2010. This contribution will address the constitutional dilemma which ensued after the president’s refusal to sign the bill. The article will describe the constitutional structure of the Icelandic constitution and its historical development. It will also address, in short, the events which lead to the president’s refusal, including a description of the financial crisis, diplomatic negotiations between the Icelandic government and the governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and the laws which were submitted to parliament in order to incorporate the negotiations’ results into Icelandic law. Finally, the article will address the constitutional structure which the Icelandic dilemma is subjected to within the context of similar articles of the Austrian constitution.