Open Science From a Qualitative, Feminist Perspective: Epistemological Dogmas and a Call for Critical Examination

Abstract

Open science serves to address core issues that are unique to quantitative methods in psychology, though it is typically presented as an appropriate framework for psychological research in general. In the present article, I critically examine the context within which open science operates as I bring that perspective into dialogue with priorities and goals of research that are both qualitative and feminist. I orient this examination in response to the question: what does open science mean for research methodologies that have historically been a home for transgressive and radical question-asking? Questioning the purposes of key tenets like replication and statistical significance—values systems that pose central distinctions between quantitative and qualitative methods—begs bigger questions for feminist psychologists. What counts as science? What counts as a valid epistemology? How can we avoid a further marginalization of epistemologies deemed less valid? I explore these questions, followed by a possible reimagining of our field’s engagement with open science in which I present seven suggestions to practically guide this endeavor.