Open issues in the cognitive science of conditionals

Abstract

The chapters in this book have provided an overview of the state-of-the-art in the study of how people reason with conditionals. And outlining theories of conditionals has led to immediate contact with core debates concerning theories of human thought, and, indeed, the nature of rationality itself. Three issues arising across the volume seem to be of particularly broad significance: Firstly, probability vs. logic? What is the role of probability and or logic in explaining human thought? Are they in competition or are they complementary? Secondly, single vs. multiple systems? Is reasoning carried out by a single cognitive system, or by two or more reasoning systems? Finally, background knowledge and the frame problem. This is about how thought is influenced by, potentially arbitrarily large, amounts of background knowledge. This chapter briefly reviews the state of play in these three key areas, and highlights directions for future research, both in the study of reasoning with conditionals, and in cognitive science more generally.