Oo7: Low-Overhead Defense Against Spectre Attacks via Program Analysis

Abstract

The Spectre vulnerability in modern processors has been widely reported. The key insight in this vulnerability is that speculative execution in processors can be misused to access the secrets. Subsequently, even though the speculatively executed instructions are squashed, the secret may linger in micro-architectural states such as cache, and can potentially be accessed by an attacker via side channels. In this paper, we propose <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">oo7</i> , a static analysis approach that can mitigate Spectre attacks by detecting potentially vulnerable code snippets in program binaries and protecting them against the attack by patching them. Our key contribution is to balance the concerns of effectiveness, analysis time and run-time overheads. We employ control flow extraction, taint analysis, and address analysis to detect tainted conditional branches and speculative memory accesses. <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">oo7</i> can detect all fifteen purpose-built Spectre-vulnerable code patterns <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">[1]</xref> , whereas Microsoft compiler with Spectre mitigation option can only detect two of them. We also report the results of a large-scale study on applying <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">oo7</i> to over 500 program binaries (average binary size 261 KB) from different real-world projects. We protect programs against Spectre attack by selectively inserting fences only at vulnerable conditional branches to prevent speculative execution. Our approach is experimentally observed to incur around 5.9 percent performance overheads on SPECint benchmarks.