Ontotheology and Modality II

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines the prevalent conception of modality in German rationalist school, by looking at the modal version of the ontological argument, propounded by Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, and these figures’ accounts of modality in other metaphysical contexts. It disputes two claims of a common narrative concerning the school metaphysicians: (i) they were committed to logicism, according to which claims about possibility and necessity are exhaustively explained through formal-logical principles, while Kant introduced a real or metaphysical account of modality, involving extra-logical truth-makers of modal claims; (ii) they were committed to the view that existence is a real predicate or determination, which Kant strongly rejected. This chapter demonstrates that contrary to the common narrative, Leibniz and Wolff had robust conceptions of real possibility and necessity, and did not commit to the conception of existence as a distinct determination of things and even anticipated Kant’s position on existence in significant ways.