ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS. BEING AND PERSON - GOD AND MAN

Abstract

How do we conceive of God? How can we understand God‟s agency? How do we interact with God? Can we say the relationship between God and humanity is one of free inter-personal relations? I argue that the way we conceptualise God demands that we cannot describe God as a free, personal agent or that our relationship with him is free in itself. I analyse what cognitive linguistics has to say about how we understand and assign characteristics to God, all the while measuring these implications with the notion of human and divine free will. I then discuss whether established key characteristics of God are philosophically consistent with cognitive linguistics‟ suggestions about the method of our conceiving of God. I argue that there are inconsistencies regarding the classical theistic understanding of divine causality and divine qualities which render this understanding of God incoherent. I measure the implications that these suggestions have on the notion of God‟s free agency. I will not argue for or against the existence of God, but rather comment on the philosophical implications of theological statements about the nature of God and humanity‟s interaction with God as an abstract concept. I base my understanding of God on a classical theistic foundation. On this understanding God is simple, personal, omni-benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent and can entertain an active relationship with all of His creation. I conclude that this understanding of God is not only internally incoherent, but furthermore literally impossible to accredit to God, since we cannot separate our talk of him from talk of ourselves. This means that we cannot know God, let alone coherently conceive of a „free‟ relationship with him.