Ontogenesis of the “why” question from the perspective of genetic epistemology, and its philosophical implications

Piotr Duchliński

doi:10.15633/lie.3467

Abstract

The question “why” is generally thought to be one of the most important of philosophical questions. Indeed, many philosophers hold that it is responsible for defining the essential contours and identity of philosophical discourse itself. Moreover, all attempts to reject it are perceived as a manifestation of minimalist tendencies in philosophical research. This article presents Piaget’s views concerning the ontogenesis of the “why” question. After having reconstructed the latter, it seeks to spell out their potential philosophical implications. The author argues that ontogenetic considerations can certainly play a heuristic role in the formulation of philosophical theses and hypotheses, and that they can lead to a correcting of the conceptions we tend to have of certain philosophical questions – namely, ones that do not refer to any empirical data.

Highlights

Differences in the interpretation of the “why” question occurring between Thomists and followers of Leibniz or Heidegger
Ontogenesis does philosophy no mean favour by showing that asking questions is never conditioned by some disinterestedness, but by interest in specific objects of questions
With the benefit of ontogenesis we know that children ask this question not for intellectual reasons, but as a result of emotional motivation which is expressed by surprise and confusion

Summary

Introduction

Differences in the interpretation of the “why” question occurring between Thomists and followers of Leibniz or Heidegger. In a situation like this he tends to correct the adult, saying that such questions should not be asked, because they are nonsensical, or he provides answers that take into account mechanistic causality or logical justification relating to specific inferential relationships between judgements.

Results

Conclusion