Abstract
We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which cont ains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a co mpetitive equilibrium and vice versa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincid ences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-op timal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
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