Abstract
Democratic party domination of the U.S. House of Representatives coupled with competitive presidential elections is mildly paradoxical. The same voters participate in elections in both constituencies, yet the partisan distribution of voters across constituencies is such that the U.S. House was consistently Democratic in the modern era. The consequences of the particular distribution of votes which exists in a given epoch are explored with an elementary dynamic mathematical model. It is shown that a number of significant consequences for partisan control of a legislature are logically entailed by the inevitably unequal distribution of safe seats between two parties especially under conditions of high levels of institutionalization.
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