Abstract
How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer—two individuals—is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer—one individual—has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches.
Highlights
How do we count pregnant individuals? Speaking of a ‘pregnant individual’ seems to suggest that the answer is already clear: if a pregnant individual is an individual, this is to say that it is one individual.1 Individuals may have parts; but these do not count extra
Think that exactly one individual is present where we see a pregnant individual at a certain time, you are likely to be committed to the so-called Parthood View of pregnancy, i.e., the view that the foetus, or ‘foster’,2 is a part of the pregnant individual, or ‘gravida’
If the first horn is unacceptable because of its exclusion of numerical identity between foster and neonate, it follows that the Parthood View as such is unacceptable—at least if it operates on the assumption that organisms are substances
Summary
How do we count pregnant individuals? Speaking of a ‘pregnant individual’ seems to suggest that the answer is already clear: if a pregnant individual is an individual, this is to say that it is one individual. Individuals may have parts; but these do not count extra. 2 of this paper, is no accident but symptomatic of the predominance of substance ontology in Western philosophical thought in general and of the lasting impact of Aristotelian hylomorphist substance ontology on Western thinking about reproduction, pregnancy and embryogenesis in particular It is because of (broadly) Aristotelian substance ontological assumptions that pregnant individuals are commonly viewed as containers of another. I show that the Process View, by acknowledging the processual nature of organisms in general and of mammalian pregnancy in particular, overcomes the difficulties of the Parthood View It marks out the foster as a sui generis part of the pregnant organism and secures identity between the foster and the neonate. Unlike both the Containment View and the Parthood View, the Process View captures the temporal dynamics of mammalian pregnancy
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