Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, I consider the Kallias Letters in connection with Kant's account of moral action in order to analyse Schiller's characterisation of Kant's conception of constraint as aesthetically repugnant. I show how Schiller treats the difficulties inherent to the dualistic view that human beings consist in irreducibly sensible and rational natures. After elucidating the fundamental distinctions between Kant's and Schiller's views, I argue that, although Schiller's charge of repugnance appears too weak to pose a serious threat to Kant's ethics, it nevertheless indicates a significant problem in Kant's dualistic conception of the human being.
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