One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism

Abstract

In Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of without undermining our self-knowledge.' The rationale behind my argument is idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act world among other material beings, view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is misguided. In a recent critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit idea that one can adopt both the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to existence of a mental substance and the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of world.2 Brueckner specializes in seeking out and attacking transcendental arguments, and he clearly believes that my argument is of that kind. I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. However, various patterns of-anti-skeptical reasoning have been or might be considered transcendental, and I do not want to get into profitless wrangles over taxonomy. I will instead focus on specific argument I have offered and explain why it escapes Brueckner's objection. In my essay I contend that three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about cancels our external epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in world. Second, one does not have direct epistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. Third, we cannot claim, as Descartes did, that we have indirect epistemic access to substantial self by inference from occurrence of experiences.