One future to bind them all? Modern central banking and the limits of performative governability

Abstract

In this article, I analyse the case of ‘modern’ central banking’s dual failures in effectively containing financial fragilities and inflationary pressures as a cautionary tale about the intrinsic limitations and contradictions of ‘governing through quantified futures’. I construct a genealogy of central banks’ much-vaunted ‘performative art’ of governing the economy through the management of expectations in order to reveal a crucial tension between the control of expectations about the future and controlling the future through (present) expectations of it. I argue that social scientific analyses tend to operate with a truncated understanding of performativity that prevents them from developing sufficiently precise and discerning accounts of the mechanics of performative processes to reveal their (intrinsic) limitations and explain how and why they (may) fail. By dissecting the surprisingly complex mechanics of central banks’ performative agency, I thus contribute towards a more precise theorisation of how governing through quantified futures operates.