Abstract

This study presents the evolution of the quality of corporate governance practices of listed Brazilian companies from 2004 to 2013 by means of a broad corporate governance index (CGI). Results indicate that the quality of corporate governance practices improved, notably after the creation of voluntary membership exchange trading lists that require better corporate governance and disclosure practices. The average CGI score of 5.8 (out of 10.0) in 2013 may be considered low and points to the need for further improvement. Moreover, firms score very low in the ethics & conflicts of interest aspects of the CGI, when compared to its disclosure, board composition & functioning, and shareholders rights components. The very small number of firms that ban loans to related parties and that facilitate participation in the shareholder meetings is a concern. The decrease in the use of control enhancement mechanisms, such as non-voting shares and indirect control structures, was a remarkable achievement. Even so, shareholder agreements are increasingly used as instruments to interfere with director independence and leverage the controlling bloc power.

Highlights

  • IntroductionCorporate governance encompasses many aspects, such as the ownership and control structure (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1997; LA PORTA et al, 1998, 1999; CLAESSENS et al, 2000, 2002), takeover defenses (SCHWERT, 2000; FIELD and KARPOFF, 2002), executive compensation (BRICK et al, 2006; ADAMS and FERREIRA, 2008), and board size and composition (HERMALIN and WEISBACH, 1991; YERMACK, 1996; EISENBERG, SUNDGREN, and WELLS, 1998)

  • This study presents the evolution of the quality of corporate governance practices of listed Brazilian companies from 2004 to 2013 by means of a broad corporate governance index (CGI)

  • The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of a broad corporate governance index (CGI) that provides a comprehensive description of firm-level corporate governance practices of Brazilian firms from 2004 to 2013

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Summary

Introduction

Corporate governance encompasses many aspects, such as the ownership and control structure (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1997; LA PORTA et al, 1998, 1999; CLAESSENS et al, 2000, 2002), takeover defenses (SCHWERT, 2000; FIELD and KARPOFF, 2002), executive compensation (BRICK et al, 2006; ADAMS and FERREIRA, 2008), and board size and composition (HERMALIN and WEISBACH, 1991; YERMACK, 1996; EISENBERG, SUNDGREN, and WELLS, 1998) These governance mechanisms can be adopted simultaneously or alternatively. The three premium lists are called Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado, with increasingly more demanding corporate governance and disclosure requirements. Leal (2011) provides more details about these initiatives and Carvalho and Pennacchi (2011) offer more on the premium listing segments

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