Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand why the neo‐Thomist natural law approach to social economics does not represent a trustworthy epistemological reference for the current social economists but, rather, definitively belongs to the past history of economics.Design/methodology/approachThe approach ventures beyond an epistemological, methodological, and historical analysis of the causes that led to the rediscovery of Thomism, its golden age, and its abandonment. The theoretical and practical contents of the neo‐Thomist natural law approach to social economics are also carefully examined in order to identify its originality.FindingsFrom this study, it clearly emerges that the modern conception of economics as a value‐free and context‐independent science is due to historical facts and ideological convictions and not to evidence in nature. This study also demonstrates that the disappearance of the neo‐Thomist natural law approach from the social economics debate is basically attributable to political, scholarly, and ecclesiastical factors and not to the loss of scientific reliability.Research limitations/implicationsThe treatment of the neo‐Thomist school is deployed in general terms with special reference to the principal scholars, Taparelli, Liberatore, and Leo XIII. In order to focus on the paper's aim, the author has not explored the particularity of each neo‐Thomist author's thought.Practical implicationsThe practical desirability is to always render economists more aware of the fact that the societal and ethical context significantly mattered and continues to matter in the elaboration process of the economic theories.Originality/valueThe novelty consists of the attempt to explain the theoretical and practical reasons that historically and currently determine the sharp separation between the neo‐Thomist natural approach tradition and the social economics theory.

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